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1  Introduction: Norms, Naturalism and Scientific Understanding
Among philosophers working on scientific explanation, there seems to be a growing con-
sensus that explanation is somehow connected to some form of understanding. This stands 
in sharp contrast to Hempel’s view, according to which understanding is a psychological 
notion with no constructive bearings on an acceptable notion of scientific explanation. It 
is well known that Hempel argued that the aim of explanation was not to gain understand-
ing but to deduce what was to be explained from a set of premises containing at least one 
law statement. In his view, the kind of understanding we experience in connection with 
explanation refers to a psychological state we are brought into whenever we realize that the 
occurrence of the explained phenomenon is to be expected on the basis of our knowledge 
of the laws in question and the particular circumstances.
According to Hempel the expectation itself, although being a psychological state, 
should be considered to be a completely rational state of mind as it is grounded in the 
knowledge of the logic of deduction and the concomitant understanding is caused by a suc-
cessful deduction. Others, like Michael Friedman, have suggested that it is not expectation 
but unification which gives us understanding, i.e. the insight that a high-level law unites 
different low-level laws formerly considered mutually independent. In general, philoso-
phers have associated explanatory understanding with different psychological features such 
as confidence, expectation, feeling of certainty, or intellectual satisfaction.
Thus, the picture that emerges from the literature of the old days is that explanatory 
understanding is a concomitant phenomenon, a purely psychological feeling that was 
caused by mental operations like successful deduction, unification, fitting the explanation-
seeking phenomenon into a general world-picture, or getting to know the inner mechanism 
of things in the world. And this is a consequence of the fact that the epistemic aim of 
explanation is something different from understanding.
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In recent years new proposals for understanding ‘understanding’ and its relation to 
explanation have appeared; see for instance De Regt et  al. (2009), De Regt (2017) and 
Faye (2014). To begin with, most of today’s theories of explanation consider understanding 
to be the aim of explanation, as it is argued that the aim of explanation should contain a 
response to the question why we seek explanation in the first place. The answer seems to be 
that we need explanations for cognitive or epistemological reasons because they provide us 
with understanding. Hence, understanding is no longer regarded as merely a psychological 
by-product of explanation but has become an important element of epistemology and cog-
nitive science. The result of this development seems to be a reversal of roles, whereby what 
was previously regarded as the aim of explanation is now considered to be subordinate to 
the kind of understanding one strives for.
Note that by placing understanding in the front of the explanatory enterprise, the prag-
matic aspects of explanation also move to the foreground. For both the purpose of the 
explanation and the context in which the explanation takes place play an important role in 
such accounts of explanation. A significant number of philosophers have already acknowl-
edged that we cannot get on with scientific explanation unless we incorporate these prag-
matic features of explanation into the notion of explanation itself. In spite of all their differ-
ences we find such an attitude in Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, Michael Scriven, Sylvain 
Bromberger, Nicolas Rescher, Bas van Fraassen, Peter Achinstein, and many more.
However, even though ‘understanding’ has moved to the forefront of the debate, it is 
not at all clear how this concept should be spelled out in detail. The extant literature covers 
different approaches: some with a naturalistic flavour, others with a much more norma-
tive quality. On the one hand, naturalistically oriented approaches may, for instance, hold 
that understanding in science is not merely connected to explanation. They may point to 
other forms of understanding embedded in the experimental practice and to the kind of 
understanding that follows from interpretation of data or classification of new phenomena. 
Accordingly, the manifestations of understanding in science may appear in many forms: 
scientists express understanding while they are theorizing and modelling, while they do 
experiments, while they perform interpretation and explanation, or while they evaluate the 
validity of data or scientific hypotheses. On the other hand, more normative approaches 
may focus on the standards for having scientific understanding in contrast to everyday 
understanding, both in general and in relation to a particular scientific practice. The general 
standards could be coherence, consistency, deductivity, efficiency, relevance, soundness, 
truth, and unification, supplemented with particular scientific theories.
If understanding in science should not again degenerate into a purely psychological 
notion, it seems to be a requirement of any account of understanding that the epistemic 
state in which one is placed by a cognitive act of understanding must conform to cer-
tain standards. Both the naturalist and the normativist would probably agree that any 
understanding based on deliberation requires certain normative commitments. But the 
naturalist would emphasize that it is the empirical study of scientific practice by, say, 
cognitive science that discloses the standards of understanding that scientists are com-
mitted to. These empirically discovered standards may very well vary from one science 
to another and from science to everyday life. In contrast, the normativist may argue that 
the standards of understanding are closely connected to some a priori claims about epis-
temic commitments with respect to justification, personal responsibility, and adequate 
evidence. For example, a normative theory might tell us that a person understands in 
an epistemically responsible way, if and only if he or she feels obliged to uphold or 
reject an explanation based on certain criteria of good science. Therefore, the normativ-
ist would be sceptical about empirical studies, arguing that they can’t possibly address 
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the normative goal of scientific understanding. Because, according to the normativist, 
the norms of intelligibility scientists actually follow are not necessarily those they ought 
to follow. It is not every alleged kind of understanding we may encounter in science that 
can reasonably count as a form of scientific understanding. A scientist must be ready to 
show that she is entitled to attribute to herself or others scientific understanding because 
her explanation or interpretation meets some well-established norms of scientific intel-
ligibility. However, the naturalist would be much more tempted to argue that the criteria 
of intelligibility whereby scientists do arrive at their understanding are the same as the 
criteria by which scientists ought to arrive at their understanding.
This special issue of JGPS attempts to cast some light on the compatibility of, and 
tensions between, these two lines of thinking, including questions like: What is the epis-
temic difference between explanation and understanding? Can understanding and intel-
ligibility be separated, and if they are regarded as distinct, how should they then be 
defined? Are there other forms of understanding in science than explanatory and inter-
pretive understanding? Is it possible, for instance, to be a naturalist about the standards 
of intelligibility without committing oneself to the naturalistic fallacy? Answers to some 
of these questions are not only important for theories concerning scientific explanation 
but have a significant impact on how to conduct philosophy of science. The contribution 
by Henk de Regt begins with a review of how philosophy of science has witnessed a 
shift in focus from explanation to understanding, which also seemed to involve a change 
from normative ideals to accurate descriptions of scientific practice, and to naturalistic 
approaches. Next, De Regt examines how Jan Faye’s pragmatic-rhetorical theory and his 
own contextual theory of scientific understanding deal with issues of normativity, and 
illustrates the normative implications of the contextual theory with a case study of the 
chemical revolution.
Nowadays, more and more philosophers of science who work on understanding are 
open to the suggestion that we can have understanding without truth. While such a non-fac-
tivist view may appear plausible from a naturalistic perspective, it might seem to deprive 
understanding of an important normative criterion. Yannick Doyle, Spencer Egan, Noah 
Graham, and Kareem Khalifa zoom in on this aspect of the debate between those who hold 
that understanding always involves truth and those who reject this view. The use of ideali-
zation in deriving the ideal gas law has often been at the center of this debate. Doyle, Egan, 
Graham and Khalifa discuss the principle behind the derivation and reach the conclusion 
that non-factivism provides us with a better interpretation of this case than factivism. This 
does not jeopardize normativity, however: they argue that naturalism can also give a fair 
account of the norms and values associated with rationality and scientific understanding.
Important normative issues regarding understanding concern the value of understand-
ing and the possibility of degrees of understanding. Christoph Baumberger addresses the 
latter question through an analysis of objectual understanding, offering an explication of 
it that has both a descriptive and a normative dimension. In his analysis of the normative 
dimension he develops criteria for the evaluation of degrees of understanding. Baumberger 
compares his explication with a case from scientific practice, namely how climate change 
is understood by means of climate modelling, arguing that the suggested concept of objec-
tual understanding makes sense of this important cognitive achievement of climate science.
Finally, Daniel Wilkenfeld and Christa Johnson discuss the question of the value of 
understanding. They argue that one should expect understanding to have value accessi-
ble to those other than the understander. Notions of understanding that fare well in this 
respect have value “for-hire”, in that understanding is valuable to others than the under-
stander. A review of existing accounts of understanding leads them to conclude that 
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“forward-looking” accounts, i.e. accounts that identify understanding largely with what 
one can do with it, typically fare better than “backward-looking” accounts, which charac-
terize understanding in terms of its structure or etiology. Explanation-based accounts of 
understanding belong to the latter category, and have more difficulty with accommodating 
the “for-hire” value of understanding.
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